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Regulatory Co-ordination in the EU: A Cross-Sector 
Comparison 
 
Eva M. Heims 
 
 
ABSTRACT The paper examines what drives national regulators’ attitudes towards and 
engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination as facilitated by EU agencies and offices. It suggests that a 
bureaucratic politics perspective can counteract shortcomings of explanations conventionally advanced in 
the EU governance literature by showing that national regulators’ attitudes towards co-ordination are 
driven by the aim to protect their turf.  This is empirically demonstrated by a comparison of attitudes to 
co-ordination across maritime safety and food control authorities in the UK and Germany that draws on 
original document analysis and semi-structured interviews with British, German and EU officials. UK and 
German food control authorities have a positive attitude towards EU co-ordination, but the maritime 
safety authorities contest it. While the food control authorities use EU co-ordination to enhance their 
bureaucratic turf vis-à-vis lower-level authorities, the maritime safety authorities perceive EU co-
ordination to threaten their established position in the International Maritime Organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the nature of co-ordination as one of the key limits of administration (Hood 
1976:17ff) and pervasive  problems  of  government  (Wilson [1989] 2000: 268f), governance 
of interdependence in the European Union (EU) rests on co-ordination to a large extent: Co-
ordination between regulators has become the key mechanism for managing cross-border 
risks and regulating integrated markets as national regulators come together in EU 
regulatory bodies –such as offices and agencies– to coordinate their practices (Dehousse 
1997; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Eberlein and Newman 2008; Levi-Faur 2011; Majone 
1997; Rittberger and Wonka 2011; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Slaughter 2004;). In facilitating 
horizontal and vertical co-ordination of regulatory practices, such EU regulatory bodies can 
–at least in theory- counteract the mismatch between the regulatory responsibilities and the 
miniscule administrative capacity of the EU (Eberlein and Newman 2008: 25; Majone 2000: 
279).  Given the small administrative capacity of EU regulatory bodies, they can only 
facilitate horizontal and vertical co-ordination of regulatory practices in Member States if 
national regulatory authorities accept and support them in their work (Busuioc et al. 2012). 
National authorities, in turn, remain the bodies that hold the greatest regulatory capacities and 
expertise. From a bureaucracy studies’ perspective, it is puzzling why national authorities 
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might accept oversight from EU regulatory bodies that ostensibly have less expertise or why 
they might be willing to support potential rivals in their work as they are usually regarded 
as wanting to protect their ‘turf’. Even though national regulators might not have a choice 
but to live with newly established EU regulatory bodies, they may be more or less 
supportive of them in practice. These attitudes may affect the extent to which they are 
willing to proactively engage with co-ordination in EU regulatory bodies. Without 
proactive engagement that goes beyond the formal-legal requirements put on national 
authorities, EU regulatory bodies are likely to have difficulties in fulfilling their tasks.   
 
The paper analyses what drives national authorities’ attitudes towards EU coordination, i.e. 
their (un-)willingness to support horizontal co-ordination (i.e. co-ordination with sister 
authorities in the forum of EU regulatory bodies), or their acceptance or contestation of 
vertical co-ordination (i.e. being inspected by an EU regulatory body). Considering the degree 
to which regulatory governance in the EU rests on co-ordination, it remains a critical puzzle 
for students of public administration and EU governance to understand why some national 
regulators are willing to engage with the work of EU bodies and to coordinate their practices 
with sister authorities, whilst others are not. Attitudes are crucial in this respect since we can 
assume that they drive national regulators’ behavior at least to some extent. The paper also 
considers the level of national regulators’ proactive engagement with EU co-ordination, 
which is assumed to be –at least somewhat– driven by their attitudes.  
 
 
Rooted in central insights of public administration studies, the paper applies a bureaucratic 
politics perspective by focusing on turf battles and turf protection to understand attitudes 
towards EU regulatory co-ordination. This is contrasted with the dominant accounts of 
attitudes and behaviour identified in relation to ‘networks of regulators’ in the EU 
governance literature.   In order to do so, the paper compares two cases, namely attitudes of 
British and German maritime safety and food control authorities. These cases provide 
variation across hypothesized explanatory factors that helps us to assess competing 
explanations, as well as helping us to control for unobserved explanatory factors (the second 
section of the paper presents a justification of this case selection). The presented empirical 
results are based on the analysis of official documents of the European Commission, the 
relevant EU regulatory bodies (the European Maritime Safety Agency and the Food and 
Veterinary Office), and pertinent German and British authorities, as well as 20 semi- 
structured interviews with officials. 
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The paper finds that British and German maritime safety authorities contest EU co-ordination 
in their field since they worry that it can potentially undermine their strong role in the 
International Maritime Organization (i.e. it threatens their turf). German and British food 
control authorities, on the other hand, embrace EU co-ordination since it helps them to 
protect their turf by helping them keep the complex administrative system of local authorities 
they oversee under control. That cannot be easily accounted for by the dominant 
explanations found in the EU governance literature, which has studied interactions between 
national regulators in EU regulatory bodies most extensively. This literature has not 
conventionally viewed co-ordination between national regulators as a fundamental puzzle 
since it has focused on particular governance forms –such as networks and ‘experimentalist 
governance’– at the expense of individual organizational behaviour of national regulators. 
The approach and findings of this paper demonstrate that national regulators’ strategically 
formed attitudes and behaviours are key for understanding the conditions under which 
transnational co-ordination between regulators in the EU can function and has crucial 
implications for (the study of) governance in the EU, which rests fundamentally on co-
ordination between national bodies. 
 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The first section proposes a bureaucratic politics based 
explanation of national regulators’ attitudes towards and engagement with EU regulatory co-
ordination. This is contrasted with dominant accounts of national regulators’ attitudes and 
engagement with EU co-ordination identified in the EU governance literature. The subsequent 
section outlines the paper’s case selection and data evaluation methods. The third part 
presents the empirical findings. The last section assesses to what extent these empirical 
observations substantiate the theoretical argument advanced in the first part of this article. 
 
 
TURF PROTECTION DRIVES NATIONAL REGULATORS’ ATTITUDES  
From a public administration perspective focused on organizational attitudes and behaviour 
driven by ‘turf protection’, we would expect the puzzle of co-ordination between regulators in 
the EU to be ‘solved’ by considering whether EU co-ordination infringes on their turf or 
helps them to protect it. ‘Turf’ is the relatively undisputed jurisdiction over specific tasks and 
ways of doing them (Wilson [1989] 2000: 183). ‘Turf protection’ relates to the protection of 
mandates and autonomy (also see Dunleavy 1991). In order to understand national 
regulators’ attitudes towards EU regulatory coordination, then, the paper suggests that we 
need to understand their position within the constellation of bureaucratic actors that are 
4 
 
 
involved in the regulation of the same particular industry (or risk). A bureaucratic politics 
perspective encourages us to consider h o w  national regulators’  tasks and expertise 
relate to other (bureaucratic) actors in their field. 
 
 
The literature on co-ordination in government as well as on network governance has 
demonstrated ‘turf’ to be a crucial factor in understanding what drives government agencies 
to work together or not (for a comprehensive overview, see McGuire and Agranoff 2011; 
Peters 1998). The dominant view is that agencies often refrain from working together 
because they wish to protect their distinctive way of doing things as well as their 
autonomy (Bardach 1996, 1998; Wilson [1989] 2000). For example, it has been suggested 
that managers of government agencies may have a clear idea of how best to carry out their 
work (Thomas 2003), thus signifying that turf can block collaboration between agencies in 
co-ordination or network structures (McGuire and Agranoff 2011). 
 
 
Whilst this literature has put forward a variety of managerial strategies and tools to 
overcome turf related impediments to collaboration (Kopenjan and Klijn 2004; Mandell 
and Steelman 2003), the ‘flip-side’ of the turf argument is rarely explicitly recognized: if an 
infringement of an agency’s turf can serve as powerful impediment to co-ordination, it should 
also act as enabler if co-ordination processes help an agency to protect or even to enhance its 
turf. By explicitly recognizing that government agencies can be much more open to co-
ordination than is sometimes assumed among students of bureaucratic politics, we reduce the 
risk of trading in ‘one of the older clichés of government’ (Peters 1998 304f).   
 
 
From a ‘turf perspective’, we would expect that national authorities engage in the EU 
proactively in horizontal forms of co-ordination and accept vertical co-ordination if they 
perceive this to help them to maintain their turf. Equally, we would expect national 
authorities to refrain from proactive engagement in horizontal co-ordination and to contest 
vertical co-ordination if they perceive EU co-ordination to threaten their turf. In such 
circumstances the involved national and EU actors might question each other’s role within 
the given regulatory regime and try to advance their own role at each other’s expense, 
thus leading to ‘turf battles’ (cf. Wilson 2000 [1989]: 188-195).   If, for example, 
national regulators question the European Commission’s role as a regulatory actor in a 
particular field and would prefer to curtail its activity in a regime (thereby also safeguarding 
or advancing their own position) we can expect this to affect their attitude towards co-
ordination facilitated by an EU regulatory body. In such a scenario, in turn, horizontal co-
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ordination is unlikely to be valued by the European Commission as this would further 
undermine its role and privilege national regulators instead. 
 
 
The bureaucratic politics perspective focuses on administrative actors’ interactions (Rhinard 
and Boin 2009: 2). It hence views national regulators’ attitudes as a response to constellations 
of bureaucratic actors, which provide specific incentive structures for strategic interaction. 
This has key implications for the literature on EU governance, which has provided the most 
dominant explanations of regulatory co-ordination in the EU to date. Rather than focusing on 
attitudes organizational behaviour, this body of literature has largely characterized co-
ordination between regulators in the EU as ‘network’ or a type of ‘experimentalist’ 
governance (for example, Eberlein and Grande 2005; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). Hence, 
governance form and structure binding national and EU regulatory bodies together, rather 
than individual organizational attitudes, have been paid most attention to in the empirical 
study of regulatory co-ordination in the EU. We contrast the bureaucratic politics perspective 
with the drivers of attitudes to EU co-ordination implicitly identified in these dominant 
accounts to demonstrate the added value of the turf perspective. 
 
 
The EU governance literature identifies three key drivers of national regulators’ attitudes to 
and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination: 1. One view emphasizes the importance 
of   regulators’   professional norms   and   epistemic communities: professionals are keen to 
exchange practices, learn from each other and maintain their professional reputation (Eberlein 
and Grande 2005; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Slaughter 2004: 59; Trondal, 2010: 22). Learning 
and deliberation are used to solve co-ordination problems (Majone 1997: 271, 2000: 295). 2. 
The functional perspective focuses on the interdependence of regulators in an integrated 
market as driving force of national authorities’ attitudes: Evidence shows that the higher the 
perceived level of interdependence between regulators in the EU, the more intensive their 
cooperative efforts in EU agencies and committees (Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012). 3. 
The third view, based on rational choice institutionalism, implicitly suggests that national 
regulators’ attitudes are a strategic response to the European institutional framework: The 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ view emphasizes that in principal-agent relationships national 
regulators co-ordinate if co-ordination will otherwise be replaced by hierarchical 
intervention (i.e. intervention by the principal, such as legal enforcement of EU law  –
called infringement procedure– or secondary legislation initiated by the European 
Commission) (Börzel 2010; Eberlein 2010; Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Scharpf 1997). 
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In line with the bureaucratic politics perspective developed in this paper, we expect national 
authorities to approach EU regulatory co-ordination positively if it helps   them   to   protect   
their   turf   in   the   particular   constellation   of bureaucratic actors in which they carry out 
their day-to-day work, and to approach it negatively when it threatens to infringe on their 
turf. Accounts that emphasize the importance of professional norms, interdependence or 
the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, on the other hand, would expect that the stronger these shared 
norms, (perceived) interdependence or threat of hierarchical intervention are, the more 
positive attitudes to co-ordination and the more active engagement with co-ordination will be. 
 
 
 
 
CASE SELECTION, ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
The paper compares attitudes to and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination across 
food control and maritime safety authorities in order to verify the theoretical argument that 
these are motivated by turf protection. National authorities’ attitudes to and engagement with 
EU regulatory co-ordination hence constitute the unit of analysis. An organization’s 
‘attitude’ is defined as dominant, well-established and persistent views held by an 
authority as expressed by its leadership, key staff members, and its official communication 
to the external world. Hence, empirical study of organizational attitudes requires in-depth 
qualitative study of  the views expressed by senior personnel, staff responsible for 
engagement with EU co-ordination processes, as well as official documentation of a given 
regulatory authority. To render such analysis feasible, the paper focuses on national 
authorities from two countries, Germany and the UK.  It is sensible to study potential turf 
protection dynamics by focusing on high capacity national regulators: At least in theory, they 
have the clout to make negative views about EU co-ordination known, even vis-à-vis the 
European Commission. 
 
 
The selection of two fields in which the relevant EU regulatory bodies have an inspection 
task should be a particularly tough test for the acceptance of their work by ‘high capacity’ 
national authorities. The formal set-up of the EU co-ordination structures are similar in the 
two chosen policy sectors, but they differ in their expected turf dynamics, strength of their 
professional communities’ shared norms, and the perceived levels of interdependence 
between authorities (see Table 1). These similarities and differences should reflect how 
national authorities approach co-ordination in these two cases if this is either driven by 
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turf protection considerations or by the dominant explanations identified in the EU 
governance literature. 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
 
Selecting the British and German authorities in these two sectors also gives us more 
confidence in our results as it allows us –at least partially–  to control for unobserved or 
neglected explanatory factors. Firstly, choosing national regulators which we would expect to 
have similar attitudes towards EU co-ordination in both policy sectors helps us to verify 
whether regulators’ attitudes towards EU co-ordination may in fact be determined by 
general attitudes towards the EU in the UK and Germany, rather than being 
predominantly shaped by regulators’ turf considerations, perceptions of 
interdependencies, their professional norms or a shadow of hierarchy effect. In theory, 
ministers overseeing regulatory authorities may wield influence on regulators’ attitudes, 
either through direct control mechanisms (such as appointment procedures) or through 
regulators’ pre-emptive alignment to governments’ political positions as a means to 
avoid ministerial interference. If government positions vis-à-vis the EU, counter to the 
paper’s theoretical expectations, indeed have such an effect, UK regulators’ attitudes 
towards EU co-ordination would be more negative than their German counterparts’ 
attitudes.   
 
Secondly, the selection of British and German authorities also allows us to control for 
overlooked explanatory factors in each policy sector: The British and German maritime 
authorities are both ‘big players’ in the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  If turf 
protection matters, we expect them to exhibit similar attitudes. This is also true for the 
explanations focusing on professional norms, functional pressures and the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ since they are both from ‘traditional’ maritime states with similar norms and 
concerns about interdependencies, as well as operating in the same formal-legal framework 
of the EU. If they exhibited significantly different attitudes to and engagement with EU co-
ordination we would know that overlooked factors play a significant role in explaining their 
respective attitudes.  
 
This also applies to British and German food control authorities: Both countries have a 
heavily decentralized food control system, in which a central (UK) or Länder (Germany) 
authorities oversee hundreds of local food control authorities. This decentralized setting 
8 
 
 
renders it unlikely that food control officials across federal/central, regional and local 
authorities in these countries form part of a transnational (or even national) professional 
community or perceive interdependencies with other countries as great concern.
1
 At the same 
time, authorities in both countries have experienced difficulties in coordinating the work of 
the many authorities involved. They can use vertical EU co-ordination ‘to get their own 
house in order’. If any of the advanced explanatory factors holds, we expect British and 
German authorities to exhibit relatively similar attitudes. If they differ, we know that 
unobserved or overlooked factors are crucial for explaining the observed outcomes.  
 
 
Overall, then, by choosing cases that differ on the value of our competing explanatory 
factors and choosing two national regulators to control for unobserved factors, we would 
expect the observed outcomes to differ in line with different values of our proposed 
explanations (cf. Gerring 2006: 97ff) (see Table 2). At the same time, however, this case 
selection does not allow for sweeping generalizations to the sector or the country level since 
national authorities’ positions in actor constellations can vary extensively across both 
dimensions. The findings can be generalized to cases in which the relevant EU regulatory 
body has an inspection task and national authorities that have faced control problems in 
overseeing decentralized administrative systems,
2
 as well as to national authorities that are 
major players in international regulatory arrangements, whilst not having to oversee a 
complex web of decentralized actors.  
 
 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
Data analysis and methods 
 
The empirical analysis is based on in-depth analysis of over 300 official documents and 
secondary material on regulation in the two sectors, as well as 20 semi-structured interviews 
with former and current officials (see online appendix for a list of interviewees). Interviewees 
and documents covered the European Commission, the European Maritime Safety Authority 
(EMSA), the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the German Ship Safety 
Division, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA), 
and the Ministries for consumer protection and food safety of the German Länder. 
Particularly crucial were 140 annual reports, 130 meeting minutes, 30 technical reports, 16 
agency personnel speeches, as well as inspection reports (only publicly accessible for the 
FVO).  The risk of capturing individual, as opposed to organizational, attitudes was 
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minimized by analyzing official documentation across time and selecting former and current 
staff members as interviewees. Interviewees were high level officials, port state control 
inspectors and food control officers. Empirical analysis was conducted in two steps, in which 
inductive study of the data was followed by systematic thematic coding.   
 
 
 
 
CO-ORDINATION AMONG MARITIME SAFETY AUTHORITIES AND FOOD 
CONTROL AUTHORITIES IN PRACTICE 
This section presents the empirical findings of the analysis, which show that the German and 
British authorities contest vertical co-ordination and do not proactively engage in horizontal 
co-ordination in maritime safety, while embracing both forms of co-ordination in food 
controls. 
 
 
Maritime Safety 
 
EMSA has the task to inspect national authorities’ practices in several key fields of 
maritime safety (Art.3, Regulation 1406/2002), such as the inspection of foreign-flagged 
vessels in European ports (see Directive 2009/16/EC on port state control). The European 
Commission can use EMSA’s inspection reports to commence infringement proceedings 
against Member States. In turn, horizontal co-ordination of national practices is set up 
through EMSA’s extensive training programme. It is based on the idea that coordinated 
implementation of EU law is facilitated if national officials come together to discuss how 
they are doing things within their home administrations, thus being able to learn from each 
other (for example, see Recital 5, Regulation 1406/2002; also, see, sections on training 
activities in EMSA Annual Reports). 
 
 
 
German and British authorities contest vertical co-ordination and do not proactively engage 
in horizontal co-ordination. This finding needs to be understood in light of the European 
Commission’s activism in using EMSA reports to initiate infringement proceedings: The 
first time the Commission initiated an infringement procedure on the basis of an EMSA 
inspection report, it failed to inform EMSA about this, which reportedly irritated the agency 
and the given authorities (cf. EMSA 2006: 7f).  After the first letters announcing the 
impending infringement procedures based on EMSA’s finding had gone out, Member State 
officials remarked that this potentially tainted the image of EMSA’s visits and might result 
in a less open atmosphere between the involved actors (EMSA  2006:  8).  However, the 
Commission’s proactive approach to initiating infringement proceedings did not subside as a 
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consequence (see the Commission’s annual reports on national implementation of EU law). 
The German and British authorities, as well as most other national authorities largely 
perceive this approach to be overly zealous: They have complained that they had usually 
already changed their system due to EMSA’s preliminary findings (a detailed description 
of EMSA’s inspection process can be found in Groenleer et al. 2010; also see COWI 2008). 
There have also been complaints by national officials that they do not get sufficient time to 
remedy negative inspection findings before an infringement procedure is started against 
them, and national officials have repeatedly questioned whether the level of intensity of 
inspections is necessary (EMSA 2007: 5; EMSA 2011: 6; EMSA 2011: 10). As a result of 
these experiences, national authorities are acutely aware of the flow of information between 
EMSA and the Commission. 
 
 
This awareness, in turn, hampers national officials’ willingness to deliberate and exchange 
practices on ‘how to get things done’ in the forum of EMSA’s trainings. Whereas trainings 
are popular amongst officials (not least because attendance is fully paid for by EMSA), 
national officials are permanently aware of the potential information flow between EMSA 
and the Commission and the possible infringement proceedings, inhibiting their willingness 
to candidly exchange their experience with handling difficulties. National authorities’ 
inhibitions are also recognized by EMSA officials: 
 
 
But I think another issue here is since EMSA is an EU body, Member States that are 
not performing superbly are a bit reluctant to come to EMSA and very openly 
share their problems because they sometimes feel that that might be used against 
them. […] But I think generally we create a relatively good atmosphere […] But it’s 
still on the back of the minds of the Member State officials that they cannot be too 
open about things that they are doing. [Interview M4] 
 
The training office of EMSA basically puts people together in the same room, and they 
listen, and there is not really an exchange of good practices. It is more a process of 
EMSA preaching the good word, on what a good practice should be. [...] Nobody will 
-in public like that when everybody is present- admit certain weaknesses in their 
system. [Interview M3] 
 
 
 
EMSA’s vertical co-ordination task hence does not easily coincide with its task to promote mutual 
learning and a ‘common risk management culture’. 
 
 
 
UK and German authorities’ contestation of EMSA inspections seems to be particularly acute 
since they are highly skeptical of the EU’s role in the field of maritime safety. Both national 
authorities are influential players in the IMO and defend its place as international rule-
maker (for standard-making dynamics in the IMO, see Tan 2006; for in-depth discussion 
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about the value EU maritime safety standards see Ringbom 2008). In their view, European 
rules undermine, rather than promote, maritime safety. 
 
 
I would say the biggest issue in that area [maritime safety] is the competence 
ambitions in trying to create an EU standard for maritime safety, an EU platform for 
maritime safety within an industry that is international. […] And to some extent there 
is within that the risk to undermine and to undo a lot of the good work that has come 
out of the Paris Memorandum, for example. [Interview M10] 
 
Sometimes it is good when EU interests are bundled somewhere, through the 
Commission or whomever. But not in this field. After all, international cooperation at 
the IMO is very well-rehearsed indeed. And if the EU wants to have a common 
position you can get together on a case-by-case basis. [Interview M1] 
 
 
 
The British and German authorities thus fundamentally question the value of EU co-
ordination. The European Commission, in turn, has been eager to adopt rules which are more 
stringent than IMO standards, as well as aiming to become a full voting member of the IMO. 
Both aspects are opposed by the UK and Germany as they perceive the EU’s role in the field 
to be potentially detrimental in furthering maritime safety in the context of an industry that is 
inherently global and has virtually no barriers-to-entry. Since the European Commission’s 
standard-setting role is necessarily limited by the importance of the IMO, it has detected a 
gap to be filled by stringently enforcing international/EU standards. This is a more potent 
motor for harmonization of practices than IMO standards are (Knudsen and Hassler 2011; 
Koivurova 2012). This strict enforcement through the use of EMSA reports is what inhibits 
horizontal co-ordination between national officials (see above). 
 
 
 
 
Food Controls 
 
Like EMSA, the FVO also inspects national authorities and the Commission can use 
FVO reports to enforce EU legislation in the Court of Justice (for analyses of the FVO’s 
work see Lodge and Wegrich 2011: 94-97; Vos 2010: 164ff; Vos and Weimer 2012: 12ff). 
However, British and German authorities do not contest FVO audits.  Rather, they have a 
positive attitude towards them as they perceive them to be helpful to their own work. In 
Germany, co-ordination between Länder has intensified as a means to follow-up on FVO 
recommendations: These are addressed to Germany as a country, although they are based 
on observations in (usually) two Länder. In the relevant working groups of the consumer 
protection consortium of the Länder (‘Länderarbeitsgemeinschaft Verbraucherschutz’, LAV), 
Länder now discuss how to change practices across the whole country to bring them into line 
with FVO recommendations. 
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That has really improved, the coordinating working groups of the Länder are very 
good, they really disperse the results of an audit in the whole country, so that everyone 
knows what’s going well or what isn’t going so well. [Interview F5] 
 
 
 
The FVO process has also started to pull the Länder together in areas in which no agreement 
on practices could be found amongst them before, for example, in the case of mechanically 
separated meat: FVO audit report recommendations prompted agreement on shared 
guidelines on practices (as pointed out in Interviews F3 and F5). The federal as well as the 
Länder authorities find this development beneficial for identifying and remedying 
shortcomings in official controls in Germany. 
 
 
In the UK, FVO inspections do not interfere with similarly complex federal structures. 
Nevertheless, the FSA’s role as overseer and partner of local authorities has been 
characterised by tensions. Overall, a lack of partnership and co-ordination has been observed 
(for example see FSA 2007: 7, 17). 
 
 
I want to see better partnership working between us and you [local authorities], and vice versa. Our 
effectiveness as an organisation [the FSA] is highly dependent on how you deliver. [Smith 2009] 
 
 
 
FVO inspections provide the FSA with a tool to coax local authorities –which carry out the 
food inspections– into compliance with national rules. For example, the FSA communicates 
to local authorities that any severe shortcomings found in a particular Council during an 
FVO visit could adversely affect the entire UK as this could undermine consumer confidence 
in UK products overall (Interview F8). 
 
 
Overall, authorities in the UK and Germany have a positive attitude towards FVO inspections 
since they have induced better co-ordination within their country and can be used as a 
justification for action vis-à-vis the industry: Since the FVO provides them with additional 
expertise on how to run their control systems, the FVO audit processes provides overseeing 
control authorities to be more effective in controlling their own territory. UK and German 
authorities explicitly value the input provided by the FVO as a means to improve their 
practices. As one interviewee put it ‘it is as if you were getting management consultants in 
for free’ (Interview F7). As noted by a FVO official, ‘we often get the feedback that our 
comments are helpful. Because we see things with different eyes’ (Interview F5). German 
Länder officials share this view. 
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In my experience, if something was criticised [by the FVO] it was usually justified. Even if one 
then normally tries to defend the system and to find excuses because usually it will have 
something to do with the complexity of the task and staffing issues... But one does know that 
they have struck a nerve. [Interview F3] 
 
 
 
In contrast to their maritime safety counterparts, then, UK and German authorities perceive 
FVO inspections to add value to their own work and consequently have a positive attitude 
towards them. 
 
 
Similar findings were made in relation to the increasing opportunities for horizontal co-
ordination. Gradually, transnational co-ordination in food controls is taking on a horizontal 
form by establishing structures for direct exchanges between national food control officials. 
The FVO has increasingly mediated the horizontal exchange of practices between national 
authorities through the increased use of tools such as ‘Overview Reports’ and fact finding 
missions. Moreover, the trend towards horizontal co-ordination is especially visible in the 
manner in which the European Commission (and subsequently the Executive Agency for 
Health and Consumers) has structured the ‘Better Training for Safer Food’ programme, 
which results from the Commission’s responsibility to establish a training programme for 
national control officers under Regulation 882/2004. The training programme was devised to 
ensure that control staff is kept ‘up to date’ with relevant EU standards. The trainings aim 
at ensuring that controls become ‘more harmonized and effective’ (European Commission 
2006: 5). They are seen as success by all involved actors (see European Commission 2009: 
15; this was also pointed out by all interviewees; also see its Annual Reports). The trainings 
are consistently over-subscribed.  It has been noted that officials often would like to improve 
their know-how in a given area -rather than just being focused on compliance with EU 
standards- which is rendered possible through the high quality of the courses (which also 
include ‘hands-on’ training, such as practicing inspections by visiting food businesses; 
this was especially emphasized by Interview F7). The UK and German authorities found 
these trainings and FVO inspections both extremely helpful for maintaining control over the 
highly complex administrative system they oversee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
British and German authorities embrace EU co-ordination in food controls, whilst contesting 
and partially refraining from engaging in it in maritime safety. Overall, UK and German 
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authorities’ attitudes to EU co-ordination a re  much more positive and engaged in  food  
con t ro l s  than in maritime safety.   These findings are better explained by national 
authorities’ motivation to use EU co-ordination to maintain (or even enhance) their 
bureaucratic turf, rather than by their professional norms, functional pressures or the ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’ (see Table 2). 
 
 
In food controls, British and German authorities perceive EU regulatory co-ordination to 
enhance their turf by helping them to control other bureaucratic actors (regional and local   
authorities) more effectively.   British and German   maritime safety authorities, on the other 
hand, perceive EU co-ordination to be detrimental to the maintenance of their turf: Both 
authorities are influential players in the IMO and have traditionally favoured international 
regulation.  EU co-ordination in maritime safety has the potential to undermine their role in 
the IMO, as well as the importance of the IMO as such. British and German officials 
hence perceive EU co-ordination to infringe upon their turf. 
 
 
 
Both findings need to be interpreted as a function of turf protection considerations of national 
authorities that hold specific positions in constellations of bureaucratic actors: German and 
British authorities in food controls have a position in which they are required to oversee a 
decentralized administrative apparatus, and they experienced co-ordination problems 
(between the Länder in Germany) and enforcement vis-à-vis local authorities (in the UK) in 
the past. In this constellation, they have been able to use EU co-ordination to alleviate these 
problems. This, in turn, has helped them to protect their turf in relation to actors at lower 
levels of government. The UK and German maritime safety authorities’ position, on the 
other hand, is characterized by their strong role in the IMO and the absence of oversight 
problems in relation to actors at lower levels of government. In this constellation, EU co-
ordination poses a (perceived) threat to their turf. 
 
 
The dominant accounts of attitudes to and engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination 
found in the EU governance literature are less able to explain our empirical observations, but 
still help us to make sense of some observed attitudes and behaviours: If the norms of 
professional communities were primarily driving national authorities’ attitudes (cf. Eberlein 
and Grande 2005; Majone 1997; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), we would expect maritime safety 
authorities to approach co-ordination in the EU more positively than their food controls 
counterparts. However, our findings report the opposite. That maritime safety authorities 
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perceive co-ordination more negatively than their counterparts in food controls is also 
surprising from a functionalist perspective (for example, Van Boetzelaer and Princen 2012, 
see Section I). Nevertheless, our empirical observations demonstrate that (perceived) 
interdependencies are considered by the maritime safety authorities. Indeed, the UK and 
German maritime safety authorities perceive international regulatory efforts to be most 
effective in managing risks under conditions of interdependence. Yet, they perceive EU co-
ordination to interfere detrimentally with international regulation. Interdependencies have an 
impact on attitudes, but are not per se an inducement for embracing EU regulatory co-
ordination at the expense of other forms of transnational co-ordination. Whilst (perceived) 
interdependencies are thus evidently on regulators’ minds, they do not explain the pattern of 
attitudes to EU co-ordination observed here. Especially in maritime safety questions of 
interdependency are evidently intertwined with considerations of bureaucratic ‘turf’. 
 
 
In relation to the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (for example, Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008), in 
turn, we would not expect the attitudes of UK and German regulators across these two sectors 
to differ greatly. However, we find that attitudes differ quite remarkably: Whilst 
authorities seem to be enthusiastic about engaging in horizontal exchanges in food controls, 
they are inhibited to exchange practices in the case of maritime safety. Indeed, the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ seems to work in a reverse logic in maritime safety: The ‘shadow’ cast by the 
European Commission’s enforcement possibilities inhibits free exchange between national 
officials in EMSA because national authorities are worried to be found incompliant when 
they are open about ‘what they do at home’. Incentives emanating from the EU’s rule 
framework do enter national authorities’ considerations. However, similar worries are not 
found among German and UK food control authorities. The different attitudes to and 
engagement with EU regulatory co-ordination in these two cases give us reason to believe 
that national authorities do not necessarily structure their attitudes and behaviours 
strategically in response to the institutional framework of the EU: Rather, their attitudes and 
behaviours  are responses to their position  in  the  constellations  of bureaucratic actors they 
operate in beyond the EU, such as their position in their national  as  well  as  in  
international regulatory regimes. The British and German food control authorities value 
transnational co-ordination because it helps them to maintain –and possibly even enhance– 
their turf vis-à-vis local authorities.  
 
Future research needs further test the paper’s turf-based argument in order to specify its scope 
conditions and to rule out possible alternative explanations, such as regulatory regimes’ 
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historical development. The EU entered the picture in maritime safety when international 
cooperation between authorities was already firmly established, while EU regulatory 
coordination in food safety has developed alongside international and national efforts, which 
may account for some of our findings. However, if this paper’s argument holds, we would, 
for example, expect contestation of EU co-ordination in food controls by national authorities 
that oversee a centralized food control system (such as the Dutch authority), despite the 
concomitant development of an international, EU and national regulatory regimes in this 
field. Systematic selection of such cases is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
T h e  p a p e r ’ s  f i n d i n g s  suggest that it is useful to take into account the positions 
which national authorities hold in constellations of bureaucratic actors beyond the EU context 
in order to understand their attitudes to EU co-ordination. After all, EU bodies are only one 
set of actors with which national authorities interact in going about their day-to-day work. 
This demonstrates that the well-established concept of turf protection is useful for 
understanding the fairly novel phenomenon of EU regulatory co-ordination precisely 
because constellations of bureaucratic actors are not novel. Rather, they change over 
time as new actors, such as EU agencies, committees or offices, become part of webs of 
bureaucratic actors, ranging from the local to the international level.   
 
The analysis of individual organizational a t t i t u d e s  a n d  behaviours further our 
understanding of the conditions under which a transnational ‘EU administration’ can 
function. This has implications for the EU governance literature that has emphasized the 
importance of particular governance structures and forms, such as ‘network’ and 
‘experimentalist’ governance. Equally, in helping us to understand the conditions under 
which transnational administration can be effective, it has policy implications for the EU’s 
use of co-ordination as a problem-solving mechanism. How national regulators respond to 
vertical and horizontal regulatory co-ordination in the EU depends critically on the other 
bureaucratic actors that matter to them in their daily work. Whilst this might not be surprising 
to students of public administration, it is crucial in for EU scholarship, which has shown a 
greater tendency to look at ‘national’ responses or attitudes. Such an approach might view 
UK and German regulators as equivalent to attitudes to EU co-ordination in their Member 
States. We suggest here that it is more accurate to view them as bureaucratic creatures that 
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are more responsive to their place in constellations of other agencies and authorities in their 
field –across levels of government- than as creatures of ‘national politics’.   
 
 
The bureaucratic politics perspective becomes less ‘clichéd’ (cf. Peters 1998: 304) if we 
recognize that ‘turf protection’ is not inherently linked to counter-productive attitudes that 
obstruct problem-solving.  For example, in maritime safety the European Commission as 
well as British and German authorities vigorously try to protect their turf in relation to each 
other’s claims to authority. Some might interpret this as narrow-minded attempt to safeguard 
their organizations’ power. However, one can equally interpret this as a battle between two 
different maritime safety paradigms: the British and German authorities are convinced that 
EU regulation that is not supported internationally will undo the progress made in maritime 
safety over the past decades. The European Commission, in turn, thinks that safety is 
increased through vigorous enforcement of safety standards in the EU territory. Both of these 
‘safety paradigms’ have merit. In highly international industries, resistance to EU regulatory 
co-ordination can hence result from preferences for transnational regulatory arrangements 
beyond the EU.  
 
Moreover, in food safety, UK and German authorities have a positive attitude to regulatory 
co-ordination not despite but because of the constellation of bureaucratic actors they find 
themselves in at the domestic level. The domestic level can hence clearly act as enabler of EU 
regulatory co-ordination, rather than being a hindrance to it by default, which is a crucial 
insight for students of EU regulatory governance. For students of bureaucracy, in turn, this 
implies that ‘turf’ needs to be taken more seriously as a facilitator of –rather than as an 
obstruction to- co-ordination between government authorities.    
 
 
 
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at [link to source] 
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Notes
                                                          
1
 Food risk assessment is underpinned by a transnational scientific community embodied in the international 
Codex Alimentarius Commission and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) at the EU level. However, 
food controls in the UK and Germany are carried out by local authorities, where it is more difficult to detect a 
transnational professional community. 
2
 We hence do not expect these findings to apply to national food control authorities that oversee a centralized 
food control apparatus.   
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Table 1: Case selection – Variation across explanatory factors 
 
 
 UK and German Maritime safety 
authorities 
UK and German Food control 
authorities 
Incentives for turf protection Strong 
Well-established transnational co-
ordination in the IMO, in which many 
national authorities are 
powerful players (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000, p.418-437; Tan 
2006). EU co-ordination threatens their 
well-established turf. 
Weak 
Food controls are carried out by 
hundreds of local authorities, which 
has caused oversight and 
co-ordination problems for 
overseeing authorities in the UK 
and Germany in the past. EU 
co-ordination has the potential to 
strengthen oversight. 
Strength of professional community Strong 
Long-standing co-ordination in IMO, 
as well as regional co-ordination 
agreements (Paris MoU, Bonn 
Agreement, HELCOM). 
Complemented by shared norms of 
officials with histories as international 
seafarers. 
Weak 
Weak sense of community and shared 
norms due to the highly 
heterogeneous, decentralised 
administrative apparatus. 
Degree of (perceived) 
interdependence 
High 
In the highly international industry 
of shipping –in which virtually no 
barriers to entry exist and ‘flags of 
convenience’ are widely seen as the 
key problem in maintaining 
maritime safety– interdependence is at 
the forefront of maritime authorities’ 
concerns. 
Low 
Authorities’ daily work is focused on 
inspections of food businesses and 
local authorities in a dispersed and 
heterogeneous industry and 
administrative system. 
Interdependencies with other countries 
are less apparent. 
Incentive structure for prevention of 
hierarchical intervention 
Strong 
Both EU regulatory bodies have a 
formal oversight function. National 
authorities’ hence operate within very 
similar formal- legal frameworks of 
the EU. 
Strong 
The ‘shadow of hierarchy’ provides 
incentives for co-ordination to avoid 
further hierarchical intervention by 
policy-makers in both cases. 
 
 
Table 2: Alternative theoretical expectations of attitudes to EU regulatory co-ordination 
 
 
 UK and German Maritime safety 
authorities 
UK and German Food control 
authorities 
Turf protection  
Negative 
(EU co-ordination threatens well- 
established positions in IMO.) 
 
Positive 
(FVO inspections help to increase 
control over local authorities.) 
Professional community/norms  
Positive 
(Strong shared professional norms.) 
 
Negative 
(Weak professional community.) 
Interdependence  
Positive 
(Highly visible interdependence.) 
 
Negative 
(Complexity of oversight structures 
more apparent than interdependence.) 
 
Shadow of Hierarchy effect 
 
Positive 
(Avoidance of more hierarchical 
intervention.) 
 
Positive 
(Avoidance of more hierarchical 
intervention.) 
